Constructivism and Educational Implications for Teaching and Learning

Mark Viner

 

“Objectivity is the delusion that observations could be made without an observer”  (von Foerster 1995, p. v).

 

Constructivism is a philosophical paradigm that is concerned with the nature of knowledge through human perceptions.  How a person perceives and interprets the world affects what they know.  For example, Berkeley (1710) claimed that the mind could not know without the act of perceiving.  Our thoughts, ideas, passions, knowledge and objects cannot exist without a direct connection to the mind.  An object, Berkeley argues, is not a thing in itself because perceptions and thinking about the object are not separate from one another.  Berkeley did not deny the existence of the object.  Rather, he saw the mind acting upon objects in order to make meaning.  Individuals understand what things are because the mind acts upon objects through their perceptions, values and experiences.  Berkeley states, "It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by understanding" (p. 31).

The idea of an external world or object, as it pertains to knowing and thinking has remained viable in the minds of educators and researchers over the centuries.  According to Stumpf (1982) before the philosophy of Immanuel Kant all cognition had to conform to objects located in an external world.  The object existed in the world and as individuals we possessed the ability to come to know what that object was.  Kant, however, suggested differently.  He claimed that the object or “ thing” was not necessarily an entity in itself (outside the person).  It was the knower who acted upon the thing, or object and created meaning from it.  In Kant’s perspective, knowing and thinking was an active power of the mind.  It involved the creation of presentations and representations.  Stumpf states that

“Kant saw the mind as an active agent doing something with the objects it experiences.  The mind, says Kant, is structured is such a way that it imposes its way of knowing upon its objects.  By it’s very nature, the mind actively organizes our experiences.  That is, thinking involves not only receiving impressions through our senses but also making judgments about what we experience”  (p. 297).

Kant believed the individual interpreted and made meaning through perceptions and experiences.

The traditional epistemological assumption is that a true reality exists independently of the individual person.  This assumption suggests that knowledge, including scientific theories, reflects an objective, external, knowable world we all can understand (Staver, 1998; Watzlawick, 1984).  According to Steffe and Gale (1995) traditionalist approaches to understanding knowledge claim that “the truth” can be found because it correctly reflects an independent world separate from the knower.  The view of an objective world, ‘a true reality’, according to Roth (1993), takes on an ontological assumption, a way of being that describes an individual’s place in the world in relation to external reality.   In contrast to this belief, constructivists hypothesize that it is the subject who actually invents reality and that knowledge is tied to an internal-subjective perspective where truth is replaced by ways of knowing.

Staver (2000) points out that constructivism challenges the assumptions of an empirical world because it gives up the idea of an independent world separated from the knower.  Likewise, von Glaserfeld  (1995) claims that descriptions of a true reality (a testable, empirical world) are not possible due to the fact that we cannot step outside of our internal perspectives and experiences.  He suggests knowing involves understanding reality as we experience it.  Knowledge is a human construction made by the individual.

According to Stefe and Gale (1995) constructivists claim that knowledge is created in an experimental world and that we can only profess to know something based on our experiences.  This point of view suggests that knowledge is constructed by the individual, not waiting to be discovered as a external, objective world.   These contradictions of beliefs about reality make the constructivist viewpoint incompatible with traditionalist assumptions (von Glaserfeld, 1995).  What is it then that constructivist thinkers want us to understand?  Constructivists believe that the world does not exist independent of people and it is the individual who makes reality and interprets the world.  Scientific laws, theories and hypothesis’ are tools for the interpretations of phenomena.  They are a conceptual way to understand the world around us.  These tools are not separate entities of an objective world but concepts we utilize to construct a reality (von Glasserfeld, 1995; Staver, 2000). 

Understanding knowledge and knowing how we come to know something, is an integral part of comprehending reality (Stumpf, 1982; von Glaserfield, 1995).   von Foester, (1984) as well, claims that it is we who make the observations, we who perceive the environment and in order to understand our external world we have to understand how we know.  He states  “… if I don’t see, I am blind, I am blind; but if I see I am blind, I see”  (von Foerster, 1984, p. 43).

Additionally, the constructivist perspectives do not claim that an objective world does not exist.  It does claim that we cannot know for sure based on our experiences.  We can, however, make predictions about the known world through the use of scientific theories and concepts.  These theories and concepts become viable and functional because they assist us in explaining our world. 

For example, Staver (1998) claims scientific research methods such as quantitative and qualitative research designs are appropriate tools for advancing our understanding of the known world because they “fit well” into our claims about knowledge.  Key points according to Staver are as follows:

1.  Understanding how we know is a “key” to the door of knowledge.

2.  Knowledge is adaptive and functional.

3.  Our perceptions make up a coherent system that is viable and functional for understanding what we encounter.

4.  “Cognition’s purpose is to serve the individual’s organization of his/her experimental world: cognition’s purpose is not the discovery of an objective ontological reality” (p. 504).

5.  Knowledge is a higher form of adaptation.   It is an instrument for the viable construction of a workable framework in order to understand reality.

6.  Our frame of mind pre-creates and predetermines what one finds when searching for answers to problems.

Furthermore, Staver (1995) poses the following question: Would a constructivist get out of the way of an oncoming vehicle?   A constructivist would get out of the way because they would understand that it is functional and viable to do so based upon their perceptions of reality.  It involves a perceived ‘cause and effect’ relationship with an external world.   

Rupert (1984) tells us that it is our experiences that suggest there must be cause and effect to the external world, when in reality, he claims that there may not be one.  Watzlawick (1984) claims that time, space, and linear events seem real but in actuality they are only structures and frameworks for understanding our world.  He indicates that common sense and our perceptions of real life are perceived as a progression of events when, in fact, only our impression makes this seem to be true.  He points out that  “A” doesn’t necessarily lead to “B” and it  is our perception and thinking that creates a viable link to “why” something happened.  We perceive a relationship that enables us to construct a working model of reality.

The philosopher Bertrand Russell hypothesized that cause and effect are not directly explainable.  He claimed that we can only know what we know based on our experiences.  Causality to Russell is nothing more than the need of the human mind.  He believed that all one can really do is justify their assumptions (Gaarder 1996; Rupert 1984).

Contributions by von Glaserfeld (1995), indicates that traditional learning and teaching models were developed based upon the perceived scientific laws of cause and effect.  B.F. Skinner’s behavioral experiments on rats and pigeons were used to develop relationships and connections on the belief that learning could test for a true reality.  For example, a type of empirical testing for knowledge would be a behavioral approach to teaching and learning such as B. F. Skinner’s stimuli-response reactions where reinforcement fosters repetition.  Training by repetition may modify behavior but according to von Glaserfeld, it does little for knowledge acquisition and thinking.  Traditional approaches to learning often train students to give right answers while leaving them with no understanding of the problem or conceptual framework needed to solve problems.  von Glaserfeld suggests knowledge is not a series of stimuli-response reactions.  It is  “real” and connected to an experimental world that looks for “… a viable model of how we manage to construct a relatively stable, orderly picture from the flow of our experience” (p. 57).

 Constructivists’ perspectives encourage the building of meaning and knowledge by changing the very nature of the questions we ask about reality.  Constructivism promotes the development of learning theories for understanding by concerning itself with ways of knowing how someone makes a claim of knowledge.  It does not concern itself with external truths.  Constructivist educational settings would incorporate knowledge building.  They would have students explain their reasoning by the means of developing a viable “fit” or explanation (Staver, 2000).   The notion of truth in education becomes replaced by the concept of viability.  Conceptual models and scientific theories are viable if they prove competent in the contexts in which they were created.  They become relative to the goal or problem presented.  Viability is a matter of constructing a model of a coherent world which eliminates the ultimate truth because there is always more than one way of knowing and doing (Steffe & Gale 1995).

The constructivist paradigm suggests that there is always more than one way to solve a problem because learning is done in the context of a situation where value is placed upon knowing why one needs to know.  Roth (1993) hypothesizes that constructivist environments account for learning that occurs in cognitive apprenticeships where people work and learn in natural contexts to solve problems.   von Glaserfeld (1995) agrees and suggests that most, if not all learning, occurs through our experiences in the “real world”.

Roth (1993) claims that a benefit of constructivism is that it can be used as a mechanism for testing about the knowledge claims of students.  Constructivist paradigms call for research that looks at the tasks students do and at the same time tries to understand how students perceive those tasks.  Research designs in educational settings call for investigations concerning how students encode information and make use of knowledge and understand how participants interpret meaning.  The best approach for researchers, according to Roth, becomes a descriptive approach that is able to reflect on classroom practices and construct knowledge through observations and participation.

Taking a constructivist view of knowledge and knowing directs the questions we ask and determines how one goes about constructing answers.  Knowledge for the constructivist is operational.  It is how one functions in ‘real life’ to solve problems.  To understand a problem one must see it as one’s own problem to be solved.  It allows for multiple and viable pathways for building knowledge.  It focuses on what happens inside the heads of students, assessing their interpretations and reflections within the context of solving a problem.  An appropriate constructivist environment would enable students to participate in the construction of knowledge, involving the immediate community or classroom in order to address local problems.

            In 1916 Dewey asserted that we cannot separate knowledge and thinking from our experiences and methods of doing because they are intertwined with the thinking process.  Thinking, according to Dewey, is an ongoing process that is never finished.  It involves making connections and forming relationships.  Dewey indicates there is a false assumption tied to traditional learning theories  "...  that method is something separate is connected with the notion of the isolation of mind and self from the world of things" (p. 179). 

Bruner (1990) notes that meaning is relative to a framework or point of reference to the knower whereas knowledge is not seen as a question of right or wrong but of interpretation.  The object of interpretation is for understanding, not explanations.  It looks for a" truth likeness" (p.90).  No matter how hard we try, Bruner claims one cannot think outside the box, the root paradox.  The root paradox cautions us that we are constrained by our perceptions.  We are limited by ‘how’ and ‘what’ we know.  All one can really do is make a corresponding guess to what the real world is and go "meta", that is, to think about one’s own thinking in order to understand how one knows.

For the constructivist, seeing a ‘real world’ is a reflection of one’s own concepts, goals and intentions.  It defines their questions and how they search for answers.  Watzlawick emphasizes the point by quoting Shakespeare: “nothing is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so” (p. 237).

 

References

           

Berkeley, G. (1710).  A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge (Reprint edition, 1913).  Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing Company.

Bruner, J. (1990)  Acts of meaning. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Bruner, J. (1996).  The culture of education.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Dewey, J.  (1916).  Democracy and education (Macmillion Paperbacks Edition, 1961).  New York: The Macmillion Company.

Foerster, H. von. (1984).   On constructing a reality. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.),  Invented reality (pp. 41-61).  New York: Norton.

Forrester, D.,  &  Jantzie, N. (1999).  Learning theories.  [On-line]. Available: www.acs.ucalgary.ca/~gnjantzi/learning_theories.htm.

Gaardner, J.  (1996).  Sophie’s world: A novel about the history of philosophy.  New York: Berkley Books.

Glasser, E.  von  (1995).  Radical Constructivism: A way of knowing and learning.  Washington D.C: Falmer Press.

Roth, M. W.  (1993).   In the name of constructivism: Science education research and the construction of local knowledge.  Journal of Research In Science Teaching, 30(7),  799-803.

Staver, J.  (1995).  Scientific research and oncoming vehicles: Can radical constructivists embrace one and dodge the other?  Journal of Research In Science Teaching, 32(10), 1125-1128.

Staver, J.  (1998).  Constructivism: Sound theory for explicating the practice of science and science teaching.  Journal of Research In Science Teaching, 35(5), 501-520.

Staver, J. (2000)  Constructivism: Sound theory for resolving the discord between science and religion, including the controversy between evolution and creation.  Manuscript submitted for publication. 

Steffe,  L. P., & Gail, J. E.  (1995).  Constructivism in education.  Hillsdale, NJ: Lawerence Erlbaum.

Stumpf, S. E. (1982).  Socrates to sartre: A history of philosophy (third edition).  New York: McGraw-Hill.

Watzlawick, P. (1984) Self-fulling prophecies.  In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), In vented reality (pp.95-116). New York: Norton.